Peace as a Human Right by Rostow, Eugene V.
NYLS Journal of International and
Comparative Law
Volume 4
Number 2 Volume 4, Number 2, 1983 (Symposium:
Nuclear Arms and World Public Order)
Article 2
1983
Peace as a Human Right
Eugene V. Rostow
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/
journal_of_international_and_comparative_law
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by DigitalCommons@NYLS. It has been accepted for inclusion in NYLS Journal of International
and Comparative Law by an authorized editor of DigitalCommons@NYLS.
Recommended Citation
Rostow, Eugene V. (1983) "Peace as a Human Right," NYLS Journal of International and Comparative Law: Vol. 4 : No. 2 , Article 2.
Available at: https://digitalcommons.nyls.edu/journal_of_international_and_comparative_law/vol4/iss2/2
PEACE AS A HUMAN RIGHT*
EUGENE V. ROSTOW**
Thank you for the honor you have bestowed on me tonight. No
compliment could have more meaning for me than the award of a
medal for services to the cause of ethics in public life-a medal graced
by the name of Earl Warren, and conferred by a pioneering and distin-
guished university in the tradition of Judaism. It has been said that
praise does no harm if you don't inhale. I promise not to inhale. But I
treasure this precious gift, and shall always do so.
I was brought up and have lived most of my life in New England,
spending many years at Yale, a university founded by Congregational
ministers to cherish learning and preserve the faith of the fathers. De-
spite their limited number, the Congregationalists and other Puritans
have been critically important in shaping American civilization. That
impact also is manifest in a unique bond between Judaism and the
culture of the United States, a linkage quite different from the rela-
tionship between Judaism and the culture of other Christian countries
where Jews live, except perhaps for Scotland. Both Jews and the Yan-
kee Puritans are nurtured on the Bible, worship without benefit of
Bishops and live in the yoke of a compact with the Almighty. Both are
stiff-necked people, extreme individualists in the mold of the prophet
Jeremiah, who thought it was perfectly proper for a free man to chal-
lenge the Lord to explain wherefore the wicked flourish. And above all,
both the Yankees and Jews are people of the law, who understand the
centrality of law in the life of civilized societies, and are forever trying
to regulate their lives with covenants, compacts, constitutions and
rules.
It is, therefore, hardly remarkable that the United States has al-
ways been a leader among the nations in pursuing the ideal of the rule
of law, not only in our domestic governance, but also in the governance
of the society of nations. Many questions which are pragmatic issues of
politics in other democracies are issues of law for Americans. Our writ-
ten constitutions, coupled with the practice of judicial review, have be-
come steadily more insistent pressures, helping to bring the law in fact,
* The following article is based on the author's remarks on receiving the Earl
Warren Medal for Ethics and Human Relations from the University of Judaism, Los
Angeles, California, June 7, 1983.
** Sterling Professor of Law and Public Affairs, Yale Law School; Former Director,
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.
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the law at the end of the policeman's stick, up to the standard of the
law on the books, and to bring the law on the books up to the standard
of our changing aspirations. The Fourteenth Amendment' was treated
with malign neglect for fifty years or more. But it was a profound and
pervasive influence on the law even when it was not enforced-a call to
our conscience that could not be ignored forever. Now, in the name of
the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights2 as a whole, the
Courts and Congress are reordering our society through a peaceful
revolution we all know is right.
The flowering of the Bill of Rights during the last generation is
simply the most dramatic instance of a process of law-making which is
touching every part of our public life, both at home and abroad. The
government of the United States from its earliest days has played an
active and productive part in seeking to bring international society
under the rule of law. The infant republic had an influence entirely
disproportionate to its population and military power in encouraging
the reform and development of international law and its fulfillment
through arbitration, adjudication, treaties and the good offices of diplo-
macy. Grotius and Vattel had no followers more devoted than John
Marshall, Joseph Story and the early American Secretaries of State.'
Moreover, the American influence was of critical importance to the es-
tablishment of the International Court of Justice and its predecessors
at the Hague, the League of Nations and the United Nations.4
I wish tonight to concentrate on the international dimension of the
rule of law, that is, on international law as a component of our foreign
policy. My argument is simple but radical in its implication for the
small, turbulent and contracting nuclear world in which we have no
1. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
2. Id. amends. I-X.
3. See, e.g., THE MISCELLANEOUS WRITINGS OF JOSEPH STORY (W.W. Story ed. 1972),
where Grotius and Vattel are mentioned as authorities on the law of nations. See also
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet. 515) 214, 243 (1832), where Chief Justice Marshall
cited Vattel as authority for the proposition that dependent allies "do not thereby cease
to be sovereign and independent states, so long as self-government and sovereign and
independent authority are left in the administration of the state." For questions con-
cerning the origin and nature of law and society, Thomas Jefferson is known to have
referred to works of Grotius, Le Droit de la Guerre et de la Paix, and Vattel, Droit de
Gens and Questions de Droit Naturel. C. SANFORD, THOMAS JEFFERSON AND His LIBRARY,
126-27 (1977).
4. See generally S.M. FINGER, YOUR MAN AT THE U.N. (1980); D.F. FLEMING, THE
UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD COURT (revised ed. 1968); H. FOLEY, WooDRow WILSON'S
CASE FOR THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS (1923); F. MORLEY, THE SOCIETY OF NATIONS (1932);
W.A. SCOTT & S.B. WITHEY, THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS: THE PUBLIC
VIEW (1958); THE UNITED STATES AND THE UNITED NATIONS (F.B. Gross ed. 1964); A.
ZIMMERN, THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS AND THE RULE OF LAW: 1918-1935 (1945).
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choice but to live. It is that not only the deepest national interests of
the United States but our nature as a people, a society and a civiliza-
tion require us to base our foreign policy firmly and unequivocally
upon international law, especially on the law of peace. We should re-
gard peace not as an historical accident, or the casual gift of princes,
but as a human right defined by law; we should accept the fact that
peace is indivisible, as a Soviet Foreign Minister used to say during the
nineteen-thirties;5 and we should make it the first task of our diplo-
macy and security policy to help fulfill the world-wide system of peace
we have inherited.
Few realize that in the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of
1961,6 proposed and passed on a bipartisan basis, Congress declared
that it is "an ultimate goal of the United States" to subordinate the
international use of force to the rule of law, and that the ultimate duty
of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency is to provide an impulse
to this end in the development of our foreign policy.7 As Congress rec-
ognized in the statute, the quest for arms control treaties is meaning-
less except as part of a larger quest to bring international society under
the control of a universal and effective system of international law.
What the statute embodies is the judgment that on this contracting
and interdependent planet, where modern science offers mankind both
infinite promise and infinitely hideous danger, the course of the law is
the most prudent and most promising foundation for the security of
the United States. It is a cliche to say that the achievement of interna-
tional peace is the supreme challenge of our time, but it is a cliche
which must become a call to arms. The task has terror and immediacy
that give it volcanic implications. It frames and pervades every other
issue with which we deal, and this will remain the case for the indefi-
nite future.
What do we mean by the word "peace" and the phrase "system of
peace"? International peace, like domestic tranquillity, is a condition
achieved not by force alone, but by law and by the state of opinion
which sustains law. Peace denotes much more than the absence of vio-
lence. There is no violence in the streets of a city governed by a dicta-
tor. The states which constitute the society of nations differ widely in
history, culture and ideology. But they share or profess to share a code
of values which reflect the nature of states and the necessities of their
5. Maxim Litvinov was Soviet Foreign Minister under Joseph Stalin. See, e.g., Litvi-
nov's reaflirmance of "the principles of collective security and the indivisibility of peace"
in the context of his condemnation of the Italian invasion of Ethiopia in 1935-36. 19
LEAGUE OF NArIONS O.J. 341 (1938).
6. Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C. §§ 2551-2590 (1979).
7. Id. § 2551.
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cooperation within the state system. That code reflects as well the con-
temporary aspirations of humanity both for peace and for economic,
social and political progress achieved in peace. The fullest statement of
the code of values for the society of nations is the Charter of the
United Nations--often honored in the breach, as we know, but as im-
portant to the future of international society as the Fourteenth
Amendment has been for us at home. The rules of a legal system can
be effective legal norms even when they are not perfectly enforced. But
they cease to be norms, and become no more than utopian dreams, if
society loses its capacity to fulfill them, or abandons the task of trying
to do so.
It is common in the United States and in England to confuse two
quite different aspects of our foreign policy-our interest in peace, on
the one hand, and our special interest in helping the democratic na-
tions which share our culture and our values, on the other. We did not
help Stalin against Hitler during the Second World War because we
thought Stalin had become a democrat, nor are we helping the Peoples'
Republic of China today because we are under any illusions about the
human quality of its regime. Our policies with respect to world public
order have nothing to do with the degree of decency of the regimes we
are aiding. We helped the Soviet Union a generation ago, and we are
helping China now, because we share with those nations an equal inter-
est in opposing aggression and hegemony, and achieving and maintain-
ing a balance of power in the world-a distribution of power which
could prevent a predatory nation from achieving dominion.
There is no way of ignoring our obligation in this respect. America
cannot be secure as an island of peace, isolated behind its oceans and
its nuclear weapons in the world as it is. We were unable to escape
what President Washington called "the general convulsions"' of world
politics even in the days before 1914, when we were protected by the
Concert of Europe 0 and the British fleet. We certainly cannot expect
8. See U.N. CHARTER preamble and art. 1 (general statement of purpose to maintain
international peace, to safeguard human rights and to promote "the economic and social
advancement of all peoples"); id. art. 55 (more particularized statement of purpose,
which identifies social and economic goals such as "higher standards of living, full em-
ployment," health care, "international cultural and educational cooperation" and preser-
vation of human rights).
9. See, e.g., The Farewell Address, in WRITINGS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON (L.B. Evans
ed. 1908) (repeated warnings against "the mischiefs of foreign intrigue," "the insidious
wiles of foreign influence," and the "duty" of the United States to maintain "a neutral
conduct" vis d vis the European conflicts at the end of the 18th century). Id. at 554-59.
10. See E. LIPSON, EUROPE IN THE 19TH AND 20TH CENTURIES 211-21 (1963). The Con-
cert of Europe was formed to prevent the recurrence of wars and revolutions which had
once engulfed the continent of Europe. "[The Concert] provided a basis for common
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to do so now, when Britain and France are no longer the arbiters of
world power, and only the United States can lead in the task of achiev-
ing and maintaining the balance of power. But the first panicky re-
sponse of many Americans to the nuclear nightmare is to try to escape
down the rabbit hole of history. The powerful memory of our isolation-
ist past is gaining in strength. Its appeal is that of a treacherous mi-
rage; we must put it aside as an illusion. There is not the slightest
reason to doubt the capacity of the American people and their govern-
ment to protect our interests in world politics by peaceful means-by
deterrence and alliance diplomacy-and not by war. But success in
such an effort will require of us the unblinking realism, energy and
faith which have characterized American diplomacy at its most crea-
tive moments.
Secretary of State Acheson once said that it was characteristic of
the impatient and restless American temperament to think of problems
as headaches, transitory pains which could be made to go away if we
took two aspirins."' The problem of peace, he commented, is not like
that at all. It is like the pain of making a living, and would never go
away."'
Today, we are all conscious of the unthinkable and unspeakable
dangers of nuclear war, and are resolved to do everything within our
power to prevent it. Many of us turn with pathetic hope to the possi-
bility of arms control agreements with the Soviet Union as a magic and
aseptic way to achieve peace -a political equivalent of the aspirin tab-
lets about which Acheson spoke. No belief could be more harmful to
our national health. Arms control agreements can be useful tools of our
foreign and security policies, and they are well worth pursuing. They
are not, however, a substitute for having foreign and security policies.
Further, if they are not conceived, negotiated and carried out as inte-
gral parts of a policy of collective security designed to establish peace,
they can do great and perhaps irreparable damage to our national se-
curity. Disarmament and collective security are twin policies. Disarma-
ment is inconceivable as a practical matter unless the Western nations,
necessarily led by the United States, succeed in restoring political sta-
bility based on general respect for the rules of the United Nations
action on the part of the Great Powers, who were to hold periodical conferences in order
to deal with various questions submitted for their consideration." Id. at 218. The at-
tempt to establish a Confederated Europe failed in 1823 after lasting for a period of
eight years. Id.
11. See generally D. ACHESON, A CrITzEN LOOKS AT CONGRESS (1974); D. ACHESON,
MORNING AND NOON (1965).
12. Id.
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Charter which purport to govern the international use of armed force.13
The focus of what was just stated must be noted carefully. The
supreme problem of our time is the problem of achieving peace in the
nuclear age-not arms control, or ending the arms race, or even the
prevention of nuclear war, but peace itself. The issue was framed that
way because the so-called arms race, nuclear and non-nuclear alike, is
not the cause but the symptom of the breakdown of world public order
which has become so palpable in recent years. The welfare of the
United States will hardly be advanced if the nations succeed in outlaw-
ing nuclear war only to license conventional force aggression, or aggres-
sion through terrorism, subversion and the international movement of
guerrillas and armed bands. The state system is crumbling towards an-
archy, as the Secretary General of the United Nations has rightly
warned. 4 Iii every part of the globe, states feel themselves to be in
mortal peril. Under these circumstances, states do not disarm. They
arm. It is not an accident that the manufacture of arms is the leading
growth industry in the world today.
When one thinks of international society, two visions come to
mind: the vision of the jungle, on the one hand, with the nations in a
Hobbesian state of nature where clubs are trumps; and a vision of har-
mony and cooperation, on the other, with the relationships among the
nations governed by the rules of international law. In fact, neither vi-
sion fully corresponds to reality, which encompasses both. Modern his-
tory can be written as a counterpoint of these themes, that is, as a
persistent and sustained effort to impose the rule of law on the diverse
and unruly habits of the nations, especially with regard to the interna-
tional use of force.
The modern state system emerged from the moral and intellectual
climate of the Enlightenment, and from the experience with war of the
last two centuries. Its dominant idea is that the strongest states have a
special responsibility for keeping the peace by preventing, confining
and limiting the practice of international war. The Congress of Vienna
and the diplomacy of the Victorian age proved to be both creative and
important in shaping the state system and establishing its basic rules.1'
13. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4. "All Members shall refrain in their interna-
tional relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political
independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the
United Nations." Id.
14. See infra note 26 and accompanying text.
15. See C. WEBSTER, THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA (1965); M. ASHLEY, HISTORY OF Eu-
ROPE 1648-1815 (1973). Due to the threat of political and social turmoil left in the wake
of the Napoleonic wars, the statesmen of Europe sought to prevent a renewal of war
through the Congress of Vienna in 1814-15. The main purpose of the Congress was to
[Vol. 4.
HUMAN RIGHT
The Vienna system, however, failed tragically in 1914. The men who
met at Versailles in 1919 tried to recreate it through the League of
Nations, but their effort lacked conviction and power, and the system
collapsed within a few years. After the Second World War, the yearn-
ing of humanity for peace expressed itself again, this time in San Fran-
cisco through the conference which adopted the United Nations Char-
ter."6 In 1945, Western opinion was convinced that if only the great
powers had enforced the rules of the League Covenant against aggres-
sion in Manchuria, Ethiopia, Spain and the Rhineland, the Second
World War would never have taken place.17 Article 2(4) of the United
Nations Charter"8 categorically condemns the international use of force
against the territorial integrity or political independence of a state, ex-
cept where justified by the inherent right of individual or collective
self-defense." Enforcement of these rules is the chief function of the
Security Council, which, on paper at least, has far more authority than
any institution of the League. 0 Its nominal power recalls that which
Palmerston, Disraeli and Bismarck exercised in fact during some of the
diplomatic Congresses of the nineteenth century: the power to guide,
direct, limit, cajole, conciliate and, if necessary, to command and dis-
ensure peace by creating a balance of power among the nations of Europe. Id. See also E.
HINSLEY, POWER AND THE Puasurr OF PzAcE (1968); H. NICOLSON, THE CONGRESS OF VI-
ENNA (1970).
16. The goal of the United Nations, as stated in the purpose clause of the Charter, is
in part:
1. To maintain international peace and security and to that end: to take effective
collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace ... 2.
To develop friendly relations among nations. . . 3. To achieve international co-
operation in solving international problems ... 4. To be a centre for harmoniz-
ing the actions of nations in the attainment of these common ends.
U.N. CHARTER art. 1, paras. 1-4.
17. See E. LEPPSON, supra note 10, at 334-42, where the author discussed the failure
of the League of Nations to take effective action in response to the Japanese annexation
of Manchuria and the Italian annexation of Abyssinia. This inaction was due to the fact
that "the Great Powers bordering on the Pacific (the United States and Russia) were not
members of the League, and without their effective cooperation the prerequisites for col-
lective action were absent." Id.
18. See supra note 13.
19. See also U.N. CHARTER art. 51. "Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the
inherent right of individual or collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a
Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures neces-
sary to maintain international peace and security." Id.
20. U.N. CHARTER art. 24, para. 1. "In order to ensure prompt and effective action by
the United Nations, its Members confer on the Security Council primary responsibilities
for the maintenance of international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out
its duties under this responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf."
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pose of controversies which threatened the peace.2"
It would have been difficult to fulfill the hopes of the Charter even
if the great powers had remained together after 1945. The old state
system has, after all, tenacious habits of aggressive warfare, and the
end of West European imperialism has given those habits new oppor-
tunities. The great powers did not remain together after 1945, however,
and moments of consensus among them have been rare. Between the
late nineteen-forties and the nineteen-seventies, the Western nations
helped to enforce the minimal rules of world public order quite effec-
tively in their effort to contain Soviet expansion, but it has been obvi-
ous for the last ten years that the Charter of the United Nations is
going the way of the Covenant of the League of Nations as an influence
on the state system.
The root of the matter is that the Soviet Union has never accepted
Article 2(4) of the Charter as applicable to it. From the beginning of
the Charter era, the Soviet Union has claimed for itself-and only for
itself-the privilege of using force against the territoral integrity or po-
litical independence of states which are not governed by socialist re-
gimes, and indeed of using force even against socialist states if they are
under the control of socialist heretics, revisionists or schismatics, or if
they show dangerous signs of backsliding to democracy.
This feature of the political landscape since 1945 is so familiar to
us that we take it to be the order of nature, and assume that it has
somehow been legitimized. The special privilege of the Soviet Union to
commit aggression at will cannot be legitimized under the Charter of
the United Nations. These practices violate the most fundamental rule
of the Charter system: the integrity of states.2"
When pressed, Soviet diplomats or scholars say that for the Moth-
erland of Socialism to obey Article 2(4) would be to give up its nature
as a society and a state. To this, the only answer an American can give
is that the Soviet Union can preach the gospel of communism ad
nauseam, but that in the nature of the state system, it cannot be al-
lowed to propogate its faith with a sword.
The Soviet program of expansion, sedulously pursued since 1945,
has gone too far. It threatens the most fundamental security interest of
all other states-the interest in the world balance of power-and has,
therefore, touched nerves of great sensitivity in countries as diverse as
21. See 11 LoRD ACTON, THE CAMBRIDGE MODERN HIsTORY (1969); R. BLAKE, Dis-
RAELzI 629-54 (1967). (for a discussion on the Congress of Berlin).
22. See supra note 13. The most recent example of Soviet aggression was the inva-
sion by Soviet armed forces of Afghanistan on December 12, 1979. See N.Y. Times, Mar.
23, 1982, at Al, col. 4. See also Rostow, Law and the Use of Force by States: The
Brezhnev Doctrine, 7 YALE J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 209 (1981).
[Vol. 4
HUMAN RIGHT
China, Japan, Egypt, the NATO countries and the small nations of
Southeast Asia.
The United States, its allies in NATO Europe, Japan and other
Western countries have soberly and reluctantly begun to restore the
military balance between the Soviet Union and the West. In the
United States, President Reagan has led a bipartisan coalition which
supports larger defense budgets. This giant step, indispensable as it is,
is only half the job. President Reagan has not yet put forward a coher-
ent vision of Western foreign policy-a vision to which our people and
those of our allies and other friendly nations could rally. We have not
seriously begun to recover from the shock of the Vietnam experience in
defining the ends and means of our foreign policy. Is it the policy of
the United States in a nuclear world to defend only "Fortress
America"? Influential defeatist voices tell us that the state of nuclear
balance requires us to accept such a posture and the political impo-
tence it implies. This would be a fatal mistake. Should our policy be to
defend only the NATO allies, as others recommend? Perhaps we might
defend the NATO allies and Japan or our interests in the Middle East,
or other areas which become critical to the balance of power in the
context of Soviet campaigns of expansion? Or can the national security
interests of the United States be defended only by pressing for a policy
of general compliance with the rules of the United Nations Charter
against aggression and organizing regional coalitions to achieve it? Un-
til these questions are clearly and firmly answered, by deeds and not
only by words, there will be no general consensus in the West on either
what our armed forces are for, or on when and how they should be
used. Consequently, the influence of our armed forces in deterring ag-
gression will be uncertain.
These pressing questions constitute the next great task of Ameri-
can leadership, and define the context of the arms control negotiations.
The Charter rules against the international use of force cannot survive
much longer as effective legal norms unless they are respected equally
by both sides. Unless the Soviet Union decides in the near future to
abide by those rules, they will cease to control the behavior of the
United States and its allies. This is not an outcome the West desires.
We know that enforcement of the Charter rules is in the equal interest
of every state. They are neutral principles-rules against international
aggressive war-not rules in defense of capitalism or socialism, or rules
which favor the status quo and prevent revolution. We know as well
that conventional war may escalate to the nuclear level, given the
stress and passion which are normal to the phenomenon of war, and
that the same irrational forces could easily transform limited into un-
limited nuclear war.
1983]
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In short, the nightmare of nuclear war should persuade all the na-
tions, including the Soviet Union, that peace really is indivisible, and
that the nominal rules of international law against aggressive war
should be reciprocally respected and generally enforced. This is the
only way to exorcise the specter of nuclear war. It is comforting that
the recent statement on nuclear war by the American Catholic bish-
ops, 3 objectionable as it is at a number of points, fully embraces this
fundamental truth.
Is there a chance that the nations will adopt this course, as they
recoil from the visible nightmare of anarchy and nuclear war? It must
be conceded at once that there is no sign as yet that the Soviet Union
has taken this fateful step, despite Mr. Andropov's repeated assurances
of his desire for better relations with the United States.24 In the Carib-
bean, the Middle East, Afghanistan and above all, in Poland, Soviet
policy remains expansionist, despite a number of setbacks, and contin-
ues to use armed force as an instrument of national policy.
Moreover, the Soviet emplacement of troops and missiles in Syria,
and the radical intensification of its campaign in the Caribbean, are
ominous signs, which raise extremely unpleasant questions about So-
viet policy under Andropov. Is Mr. Andropov preparing yet another
general war against Israel, an invasion of Iran from Afghanistan and
from the Soviet Union, or both? We should all realize that the anti-
aircraft missiles the Soviet Union has installed in Syria can reach our
fleet in the Eastern Mediterranean, some of our bases in Turkey, and
the American planes, including the AWACS surveillance planes, which
operate in that tortured region.
Nor is there any progress in the nuclear arms negotiations in Ge-
neva. In those talks, the Soviet Union is still tenaciously defending its
capacity for nuclear blackmail. It is clinging to its lead of at least three
to one in the most destructive and destabilizing class of nuclear weap-
ons, the ground based ballistic missiles. It is denouncing and rejecting
the defensive principle of Soviet-American nuclear parity which is the
basis of the American negotiating position. By insisting that British
23. See N.Y. Times, May 4, 1983, § I, at 1, col. 5. See also J. CASTELLI, THE BISHOPS
AND THE BOMB (1983). In a 238-9 vote, the Roman Catholic Bishops of America ratified
the third draft of the pastoral letter, which denounces nuclear war and calls upon
Catholics to help rid the world of nuclear weapons. For excerpts of the letter see N.Y.
Times, May 5, 1983, § II, at 16, col. 1.
24. Yuri Andropov has stressed the need for a return to detente and improved rela-
tions with the United States as necessary to the prevention of war. See, e.g., N.Y. Times,
Nov. 23, 1982, at Al, col. 3; id., Dec. 22, 1982, at A14, col. 1; id., Dec. 31, 1982, at A3, col.
1. According to Mr. Andropov, "one of the main avenues leading to a real scaling down
of the threat of nuclear war is that of reaching a Soviet-American agreement on limita-
tion and reduction of strategic nuclear armaments." Id., Dec. 22, 1982, at A14, col. 1.
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and French nuclear forces be counted with the American weapons in
measuring equality, the Soviets are asking us to concede that they have
a right to an arsenal equal to the sum of all other nuclear forces on
earth. This is not a claim for equality, but for dominion.
If in the end we yield to that argument, we shall find that our
nuclear guaranties have lost all credibility, our troops and fleets will be
brought home from overseas bases, and we shall lose the capacity to
carry out a foreign policy at all.
Nonetheless, I am an optimist on these matters, not because I be-
lieve that the Soviet Union is likely soon to see a blinding light on the
road to Damascus, but because I am inclined to believe that man's in-
stinct for self-preservation will in the end save mankind from suicide.
The imperatives for survival in the nuclear age require the Western
nations to adapt and modernize the foreign policy we have pursued
since the time of Truman and Eisenhower and to restore its effective-
ness. It is the only possible foreign policy for the United States and its
allies, given the geopolitical realities. The same imperatives decree the
end of the Soviet Union's sour adventures in imperialism, and its ac-
ceptance, finally, of the rules of world public order which purport to
govern every other nation. The other nations of the world have discov-
ered that imperialism and militarism are expensive, ineffective and
without moral justification. There is no obvious reason why the Soviet
Union should remain forever blind to this truth.
Nearly a century ago, Alfred Nobel, the inventor of dynamite,
thought that dynamite was so destructive that it would force mankind
to accept peace. 5 His prediction turned out to be wrong. Can we ex-
pect the horror of the nuclear weapon to fulfill Nobel's dream? If we
are reasonable, and lucky, I believe we can. We have no alternative but
to try.
The centerpiece of that effort should be a campaign to carry out
the recommendation of the Secretary General of the United Nations to
which I referred a few moments ago. In his report last year, Ambassa-
dor Perez de Cuellar warned that the state system is slipping into a
state of anarchy, and called for a recommittal of the nations to the
principles of the Charter, especially those governing the international
use of force.2 6 The Secretary General's appeal followed proposals made
25. See M. EVLANOFF, NOBEL-PRIZE DONOR 111-17 (1943).
26. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 8, 1982 at Al, col. 4. In his first annual report, Secretary
General Perez de Cuellar spoke out against the anarchy he believed would destroy the
United Nations. Id. He stated,
We are perilously near to a new international anarchy. I believe we are at pre-
sent embarked on an exceedingly dangerous course, one symptom of which is the
crisis in the multinational approach to international affairs and the comcomitant
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by a representative of the United States at the United Nations, reiter-
ated in President Reagan's speech to the General Assembly of July,
1982.27
I began this speech by saying that the central task of world polit-
ics, and therefore the central task of United States foreign policy, is to
establish peace and that nuclear arms agreements and other arms con-
trol and disarmament proposals are simply aspects of the broader
problem. Such agreements can be helpful only if they are compatible
with the necessities of peace. The appeal of the Secretary General of
the United Nations will be just another ritual exercise in handwringing
and rhetoric unless it is backed by a major political effort in which the
United States should play an active and constructive part. To have any
chance of achieving that purpose, after the turbulence and uncertainty
of the last decade, the goals of American foreign policy should be refor-
mulated as a fresh, realistic and coherent whole, firmly based on prin-
ciple, and directed only to the achievement of peace. Fears and doubts
have plagued American foreign policy since the tragedy of Vietnam.
They cannot be dispelled by a series of fragmented actions never effec-
tively explained. An uncertain trumpet elicits an uncertain response.
As Lord Carrington recently said in a major speech, there is no
reason for the West to retreat in fear and trembling."8 The West has
problems, of course, but they are altogether soluble. Our societies are
stronger than ever-far stronger than those of the Soviet Union and its
satellites. Only our fears and sense of guilt can stand in the way of a
major effort to carry out the policy of peacemaking the Secretary Gen-
eral of the United Nations recommended last year. No lesser goal can
offer humanity much hope of avoiding the nightmare of general war in
a nuclear environment.
erosion of the authority and status of world and regional intergovernmental
institutions.
Id.
27. See Address by E.V. Rostow before the First Committee of the General Assembly
(Oct. 21, 1981), reprinted in DEP'T ST. BULL., Dec. 1981, at 68. For synopses of comments
made by member states at the Second Special Session of the General Assembly Devoted
to Disarmament, held on June 7-July 10, 1982, see U.N. CENTRE FOR DISARMAMENT, 5
DISARMAMENT, U.N. Sales No. E.83.IX.1 (Nov. 1982).
28. See N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1983, § I, at 9, col. 1. Lord Carrington, former Foreign
Secretary of Great Britain who resigned after Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands,
spoke at the Alistair Buchanan Memorial Lecture at Kings College, London on the
problems faced by the Western countries today. Id.
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